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IMPEDIMENTS TO STABILITY IN IRAQ: THE ILLUSIVE ECONOMIC DIMENSION 
Robert Looney* 
 
*The following article is an extract from Barry Rubin (ed.), Iraq After Saddam (Sharpe, 
forthcoming). 
 
Of the major contributors to stability in Iraq--military, political, and economic, the economic 
dimension has received the least attention from both the United States and the Iraqi authorities.  In 
turn, the country’s failed economy has undermined efforts in the other two key areas. While many 
mistakes have been made in trying to jump-start the economy, a number of lessons emerge from 
these efforts. Rather than piece-meal programs, economic recovery must be part of a comprehensive 
strategy oriented toward creating a virtuous circle whereby improved security leads to economic 
gains which in turn facilitate improvements in governance and market reforms. 
 
In a significant policy statement released 
toward the end of 2005, the United States 
outlined its strategy for victory in Iraq.1 It 
defines victory in terms of a sequential set of 
completed goals. In order to achieve victory, 
in the short term, Iraq must make steady 
progress in fighting terrorists, meet political 
milestones, establish democratic institutions, 
and build standup security forces; in the 
medium term, Iraq must defeat terrorists and 
provide its own security, have a fully 
constitutional government in place, and be on 
its way to achieving its economic potential; 
and in the longer term, Iraq must be peaceful, 
united, stable and secure, well integrated into 
the international community, and a full partner 
in the war on terrorism. 
Along with developing democracy and 
providing security, then, reviving the economy 
is seen as one of the three most important 
issues for achieving victory in Iraq. In the 
economic area, U. S. and Coalition efforts 
focus on helping Iraq restore the country’s 
neglected and damaged infrastructure, with the 
goal of restoring and expanding essential 
services. Other objectives include the creation 
of a market-based economy and greater 
transparency and accountability in the public 
sector.2 
The logic of this strategy is 
straightforward.3 First, the rebuilding of Iraq’s 
infrastructure and the provision of essential 
services would increase the confidence of 
Iraqis in their government and help convince 
them that the government is offering a brighter 
future. People would then be more likely to 
cooperate with the government and provide 
intelligence against the enemy, creating a less 
hospitable environment for terrorists and 
insurgents. 
Second, the reconstruction efforts have 
significant implications in the security realm 
when they focus on rebuilding post-conflict 
cities and towns. Compensation for civilians 
hurt by counter-terrorist operations and the 
restoration of some economic vibrancy to 
areas formerly under terrorist control could 
help ease resentment and win over an 
otherwise suspicious population. 
Third, economic growth and reform of 
Saddam-era laws and regulations would be 
critical to ensuring that Iraq could support and 
maintain the new security institutions that the 
country is developing, attract new investment 
to Iraq, and become a full and integrated 
member of the international community. 
Finally, economic growth and market 
reform--the promotion of Iraq’s private sector-
-are necessary to expand job opportunities for 
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the youthful Iraqi population and to decrease 
the unemployment that makes some Iraqis 
more vulnerable to terrorist or insurgent 
recruiting. 
While this strategy has many merits, it is 
basically a continuation of the long-term 
approach taken by Ambassador L. Paul 
Bremer III and the Coalition Provisional 
Government (CPA) in 2003. Later, 
Ambassador Bremer expressed reservations 
over the course he set out for Iraq’s economic 
recovery: 
 
We also placed too much emphasis on 
large-scale reconstruction projects. 
While the urgent need for modern 
highways, electrical generating plants 
and the like was clear, we should have 
anticipated that building them would 
take a long time. Our earlier efforts 
should have been directed more tightly 
at meeting Iraqis’ day-to-day needs.4 
 
Iraqis themselves are increasingly skeptical 
of the viability of the postwar economic 
strategy. Certainly the ability to complete 
infrastructure projects on time and within 
budget has proven to be a nearly impossible 
task. As noted by the U.S. inspector general 
for Iraq reconstruction, infrastructure 
programs in that country have been plagued by 
“violence, corruption, and mismanagement.”5 
As a result, “the ambitious U.S. reconstruction 
effort in Iraq is likely to fall far short of its 
goals because soaring security costs and poor 
management have slashed the amount of 
American money available for rebuilding 
projects.”6 Just as serious is the extremely 
long lead time before the average Iraqi sees 
any tangible benefits in terms of improved 
living standards. 
 Implicit in Ambassador Bremer’s 
assessment is that the main flaw in the U.S. 
strategy has been its inability to deliver short-
run economic gains to large segments of the 
Iraqi population. 
While we still don’t have a complete 
picture of the contemporary dynamics of the 
Iraqi economy, it is still safe to say that the 
country’s economic health will be a key 
determinant of the country’s long-run 
stability.7 Clearly, factors such as the “brain 
drain” and lack of commercial credit,8 
together with uncertainty due to the security 
situation, have largely brought investment in 
the formal segments of the economy to a halt.9 
Yet from anecdotal accounts, there are 
indications that many areas of the shadow 
economy are prospering and--as during the 
period of sanctions--successfully adapting to 
the harsh environ 10ment.   
With these themes in mind, the purpose of 
the sections that follow is to examine the 
means by which the economy can contribute 
toward building a viable new Iraq. First, an 
assessment is made of key issues surrounding 
the economy, including an examination of the 
initial obstacles to the economy’s 
reconstruction; the approach taken toward the 
economy in the post-war period; the major 
accomplishments and failures of postwar 
reconstruction; and the lessons learned thus 
far. 
Second, based on this assessment, several 
key areas are highlighted as critical to the 
establishment of a broad-based inclusive 
economy capable of supporting a new, modern 
Iraqi state. 
 
OBSTACLES TO RECONSTRUCTION 
 
Even without the insurgency, Iraq’s 
reconstruction would have been a monumental 
undertaking. Saddam Hussein’s economic 
legacy will be present for some time. In 
particular, that regime’s questionable 
economic policies and mismanagement of the 
economy together with political repression, 
internal conflicts, wars, and sanctions left a 
number of serious impediments to recovery 
and growth. Initial reconstruction efforts dealt 
largely with correcting and reversing the 
effects of debilitating forces that had built up 
over the years.11 Such efforts included the 
restoration of government economic functions 
after looting and state collapse; the prevention 
of currency collapse, hyperinflation, and 
economic chaos; the rebuilding of 
infrastructure ravaged by war, sanctions, 
looting, and neglect; the rehabilitation of a 
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health care system cut off from medical 
advances for two decades; the dismantling of 
corrupt, dysfunctional state economic controls; 
and the stimulation of the growth of a private 
sector that had been stunted by government 
interference. 
A number of major successes did occur, 
especially under the CPA. The CPA 
reestablished a nationwide food-ration system 
and rehabilitated several thousand schools, 
health clinics, and hospitals. Furthermore, it 
provided public services to populations 
deprived under Saddam, as well as funded 
small projects across Iraq to meet critical 
community needs. The CPA also was 
responsible for increasing electrical generation 
and output. 
On an economic level, the provisional 
government introduced a new currency and 
stabilized the exchange rate; liberated most 
prices without igniting inflation; rebuilt the 
government’s economic ministries; and 
promulgated market-oriented banking, 
taxation, foreign trade, investment, and 
business regulations. 
Still, the Coalition’s economic 
accomplishments were overshadowed by its 
unfulfilled promises. During the occupation, 
the CPA was unable to prevent rampant 
looting of infrastructure and production 
facilities. It failed to attract foreign 
investment, implement its newly enacted 
economic regulations, restructure state-owned 
industries, or fulfill promises of substantial job 
creation. Similarly, the CPA did not meet 
targets for electricity production—despite 
increases—restore oil production to prewar 
levels, eliminate costly distorting energy and 
food subsidies, or combat corruption in 
reconstruction projects. The Coalition was 
unable to spend more than a fraction of the 
$18.4 billion the U.S. Congress allocated for 
Iraq’s reconstruction. 
In sum, the net result of postwar economic 
efforts has been disappointing, though some 
economic obstacles and distortions are 
lessening thanks to the reforms put in place by 
the CPA.12  
Many problems were created or reinforced 
through postwar policy errors and 
miscalculations.13 The net result is an 
economy wherein the oil sector dominates the 
economy, accounting for around 74 percent of 
GDP.14 Iraq now depends solely on oil exports 
for finance of investment and consumption 
expenditures, for government revenues—of 
which oil export proceeds exceed 93 
percent—and for 98 percent of foreign 
currency earnings. 
Another setback is that centralized 
decisionmaking and intrusion of the state into 
economic life have distorted the pricing 
structure in many sectors to the extent that 
prices often do not reflect the real value of the 
product or service. In turn, distorted prices 
have caused inefficiencies and waste. The 
public sector is overrepresented in the 
economy, leading to inefficiency and 
decreased growth. Many state enterprises are 
currently dormant. The weakness of the 
private sector has limited its role in economic 
development, increasing the lack of 
diversification. 
Additional problems plague the public 
sector. Poor governance practices are 
common, including widespread nepotism in 
public appointments and corruption among 
public servants. The lack of accountability and 
transparency in managing state resources has 
abetted corruption and increased its corrosive 
effect on growth and efficiency. Iraq’s 
decades-long isolation has resulted in the 
digital divide, as well as in outdated 
institutions, administrative systems, and 
know-how. Technological stagnation and the 
use of outmoded production methods have 
weakened the economy as a whole; and public 
sector institutions have witnessed serious 
looting, theft, and destruction. 
Another legacy of the past was the total 
dependence on monetary expansion to finance 
the budget deficit, which led to an average 
inflation rate of 50 percent annually during the 
1990s. While monetary policy is now on 
sounder footing, the inflation psychology and 
lack of a developed government bond market 
together with supply-side shocks have resulted 
in volatile movements in price and an inflation 
rate still in double digits. 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) 27 
Impediments to Stability in Iraq: The Illusive Economic Dimension 
 
Moreover, social inequalities are 
widespread in a broad range of fields covering 
health, education, public services, and social 
services to low-income groups, the disabled, 
internally displaced persons, refugees, single-
parent households, and other vulnerable 
groups across geographic areas. 
Unemployment ranges to about 50 percent, 
and the absolute poverty level—in which the 
population depends on the government’s 
rationed food basket—is more than 60 percent. 
Unemployment has led to an increase in 
demands for social assistance. Furthermore, 
with over 50 percent of the population under 
24 years of age, rapid rates of population 
growth are likely for many years. Many in this 
large demographic group are alienated due to 
violence and limited access to education, 
training, and career prospects. 
The traditional family unit and the 
community have remained the core of Iraqi 
society, ensuring solidarity and social 
cohesion against all odds. However, conflict 
and inequality have eroded the social fabric of 
communities and families throughout the past 
three decades. In Iraq, social capital 
establishes an important relation between 
incomes and human capability to withstand 
shocks. Iraqis have witnessed a depletion of 
social capital, which has led to social 
deprivation in most sectors of society. Civic 
participation and recognition of human rights 
were denied during the previous regime. They 
remain poorly understood and lack ancillary 
support structures. 
Finally, a large informal economy coexists 
alongside the formal sector. This informal 
economy may account for as much as 65 
percent of GDP.15 Even more worrisome is 
the large criminal element that controls large 
segments of the informal sector.16 
A recent UNDP household survey 
documents the impact the above factors are 
having on the average Iraqi household.17 The 
survey suggests that the poorest 20 percent of 
the population earns 7 percent of the income, 
while the top 20 percent earns 44 percent of 
the income. The survey also found that Iraq’s 
median household income has dropped to 
$144, down from a postwar high of $255 in 
2003. One-third of the Iraqis canvassed by 
UNDP described themselves as being poor. 
One-sixth of interviewees did in fact meet all 
or most of the criteria suggesting that they 
lived beneath the poverty line. 
 
MODELS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
 
Several patterns emerge.18 Most 
importantly, the Coalition’s success stories 
share some essential elements. Its less 
successful ventures also have their own set of 
distinctive characteristics. 
Specifically, successful initiatives appear to 
have imposed no major costs or sacrifices on 
the population at large. For instance, most 
Iraqis welcomed the rehabilitation of their 
schools and hospitals. Furthermore, successful 
initiatives did not suffer from security 
disruptions. This was either because the 
security situation was not a constraining 
factor—as with the creation of new banking 
regulations—or because effective steps were 
taken to provide security protection—as with 
the nationwide distribution of civil-service 
salaries. 
High visibility was another condition for 
success. Projects prioritized by Washington or 
the Coalition leadership, such as the 
introduction of a new Iraqi currency, were 
given lavish support. Funding was also a key 
element. Projects that could be funded 
quickly, without going through cumbersome 
contracting channels, achieved rapid results. 
For instance, the military’s highly successful 
(but under-funded) Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program (CERP) funds were used to 
respond immediately to pressing community 
needs. Programs that built on existing Iraqi 
capacity were also more likely to succeed. The 
child vaccination program that took advantage 
of a strong Iraqi outreach capability is a case 
in point. Finally, successful policies tended to 
be finite in scope and limited in duration—
involving, for example, the approval of a new 
law or the one-time distribution of textbooks 
to schools. 
The Coalition’s failures were marked by a 
very different set of conditions. Failure often 
coincided with high social cost. For instance, 
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the Coalition’s inability to end fuel price 
subsidies reflected its fears of sparking mass 
unrest. Also, most failed initiatives were 
afflicted by security disruptions, such as 
looting and sabotage, which precluded 
sustained progress. 
Low priorities attached to certain sectors by 
the CPA were another handicap typical of 
unsuccessful projects. For instance, plans for 
agricultural reconstruction languished as CPA 
energies were directed towards infrastructural 
activities such as electricity. Funding 
problems also characterized failed projects. 
Many projects ran into disabling delays when 
they encountered the complex U.S. 
government procurement process. 
Another common element of policy failure 
was the lack of existing Iraqi capacity on 
which to build. Efforts to collect taxes, for 
example, failed because there was not a 
history of voluntary compliance, nor the 
organizational capacity to monitor incomes. 
Finally, unsuccessful policies tended to 
involve extensive structural changes. The 
Coalition’s inability to combat endemic 
corruption illustrates the difficulties in altering 
long-standing practices and relationships. 
Perhaps because reconstruction efforts did 
not effectively incorporate large segments of 
the Iraqi population into the decisionmaking 
process, there is a widespread perception 
among Iraqis that the Coalition efforts have 
been a failure. 
 
One ABC survey of Iraqis interviewed 
in late 2005 found that:  
 
Only 44 percent of Iraqis say they 
believe things are going well in their 
country; 52 percent said they felt the 
country was “doing badly.” Support 
for the U.S.-led invasion has dropped: 
In February 2004, 39 percent of Iraqis 
told us they believed the invasion was 
wrong, but today that number stands at 
50 percent. Even among optimistic 
Iraqis it appears the United States gets 
little credit for any improvements in 
their lives. Less than one in five Iraqis 
believes that U.S. reconstruction 
efforts have been “effective.” Most 
Iraqis now say they “disapprove 
strongly” of how the United States has 
operated in Iraq. Not surprisingly, the 
percentage of Iraqis today who oppose 
the U.S. presence has spiked—from 51 
percent to 65 percent.19 
 
Many Iraqis cannot understand why 
electricity and sewage were not more reliable, 
why more reconstruction projects did not 
reach their neighborhoods, why corruption 
remained so prevalent, and why local (usually 
democratically elected) officials did not 
change things for the better. 
Another respected poll in January 2006 
found a sharp split between Kurds, Shi’a, and 
Sunnis over U.S. aid efforts in Iraq. While 38 
percent of the Kurds expressed approval, the 
numbers fell to 30.3 percent for Shi’a, and 
only 4.7 percent for Sunnis. The 
corresponding figures for disapproval were 




The postwar Iraqi reconstruction 
experience points to some important lessons 
that can provide a useful set of guides for that 
country’s ongoing attempts in restoring 
economic growth and stability.20 
Reconstruction entails painful trade-offs 
rather than easy choices. To get things done as 
quickly as possible in the early days of 
reconstruction, the CPA often bypassed Iraqi 
ministries and various local groups. More 
often than not, Iraqis and their viewpoints 
were not included in the process. This flaw 
continues to take a toll on the country’s 
reconstruction efforts. 
High hopes and lofty promises are no 
substitute for sound planning and prudent 
expectations. As we receive clearer accounts 
of the functioning of the CPA, it is shocking to 
find how little planning went into the effort. 
Expectations should be controlled to 
realistic levels. The CPA had promised to 
quickly exceed rather than simply restore 
prewar production, therefore, its many 
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accomplishments were often seen by the Iraqis 
as failures instead. 
Several contingency plans should be 
developed for each action. Proper contingency 
planning that had taken into account the 
possibility of infrastructure degradation, 
persistent violence, and revenue shortfalls 
would have resulted in more realistic 
reconstruction goals. 
Economic reconstruction depends upon 
adequate security, yet security depends on 
successful reconstruction. While the CPA was 
quite aware of the needs for security, it did not 
appear to realize that its reconstruction efforts 
should be focused not on just constructing 
physical buildings such as schools, but 
primarily on creating an environment in which 
the average Iraqi would feel secure. Delays 
should have been avoided if at all possible. 
Instead, many of the CPA’s self-inflicted 
delays in project implementation contributed 
to Iraqi feelings of resentment and despair, 
which, in turn, fueled insurgency and crime, 
thereby worsening the security climate. 
Reconstruction requires coordination of 
short-term initiatives and long-term structural 
reforms. The Coalition’s short-term successes 
in economic stabilization and small-scale 
reconstruction generated positive momentum 
for economic recovery. Yet the CPA’s 
inability to carry through with longer-term 
programs such as restoring state-owned 
enterprises, creating sustainable jobs, and 
promoting private sector growth resulted in 
lost momentum and further Iraqi frustration. 
It is important to avoid over-reliance on 
market forces in a conflict setting. In part, the 
loss in reconstruction momentum stemmed 
from the CPA’s assumption that market forces 
and a surge in private investment would 
follow the initial reconstruction efforts. 
Ideological blinders and the lack of a 
contingency plan made it difficult to overcome 
these errors when confronted with the effects 
of increased violence and uncertainty.21 
Ongoing reforms require empowered 
owners. It remains to be seen whether Iraq’s 
government will be willing or able to continue 
economic reforms initiated under the CPA. 
Clearly, if Iraqis had been consulted and made 
an integral part of the reform process they 
would be more inclined to continue to build on 
earlier efforts. The reform process is being 
largely controlled by the International 
Monetary Fund, with Iraqis again more in the 
position of resisting outside efforts for reform-
-largely for the removal of subsidies and price 
controls--rather than controlling and adapting 
the reform process to meet their own domestic 
priorities.22 
Broad-based participation is critical for 
maintaining reform momentum, but requires 
overcoming centralization tendencies. 
Creating Iraqi ownership of reconstruction 
also requires decentralization of government 
authority. Decentralization has been shown to 
strengthen accountability and stimulate 
economic recovery in other post-conflict and 
transitional settings. Unfortunately, the CPA 
was unsuccessful in overcoming ministries’ 
opposition securing funding for local 
authorities and Iraqi citizens to participate 
directly in the reconstruction process. 
Overcoming and controlling corruption is 
extremely difficult. Corruption thrives in the 
environment of post-conflict reconstruction. 
The combination of large public procurement 
projects, small funding infusions, and 
inadequate government regulatory 
mechanisms creates fertile ground for corrupt 
practices. In the Iraqi context, a long history of 
entrenched corruption in government 
economic management only compounded the 
problem. 
 
CRITICAL FACTORS FOR THE 
FUTURE 
 
As the previous section suggests, the 
chances of an improved economic future for 
Iraq will hinge in large part on the ability of 
that country’s leaders to reorient policy away 
from its postwar, centralized top-down 
orientation toward one that is more 
decentralized and inclusive. In the financial 
area, two additional factors stand out: Iraq’s 
relationship with the international financial 
institutions, especially the IMF, and 
developments in the oil sector, especially with 
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regard to oil production and the disbursement 
of revenues. 
 
Iraqi Debt Relief and Economic Reform 
 
The IMF’s role in Iraq’s postwar setting 
became clear on November 21, 2004. At that 
time, in a major development on the debt 
front, the 19 industrialized nations that 
comprise the so-called Paris Club agreed to 
write off a portion of Iraq’s debt in three 
stages. The first 30 percent, amounting to 
$411.6 billion, was to be written off 
unconditionally. A second 30 percent 
reduction would be delivered “as soon as a 
standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
program is approved.” A final 20 percent 
reduction would be granted “upon completion 
of the last IMF board review of three years of 
implementation of standard IMF programs.” 
In other words, 30 percent of Iraqi debt will be 
excused only if the IMF and Iraqi authorities 
agree on an economic “reform” package, and 
another 20 percent will be written off only if 
the IMF is satisfied that Iraq has implemented 
the terms of this package.23 
As Paris Club Members hold around $40 
billion in Iraqi debt, Iraq will still owe $7.78 
billion to the Paris Club, even if the IMF 
certifies its adherence to the specified 
conditionality requirements. If Iraq does not 
satisfy the IMF, it will owe $27.16 billion to 
the society of 19 industrialized nations. 
At the time of the Paris Club Accord in 
September 2004, the Iraqi authorities 
apparently concluded that the economy was at 
the point where it was capable of successfully 
undertaking an initial IMF program. Given the 
country’s postwar state, together with the 
ongoing insurgency, the IMF’s Emergency 
Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program 
seemed the most appropriate choice. 
Furthermore, completion of this program 
would allow the government to move to a 
more ambitious economic program of reform 
that would address remaining structural 
impediments to long-term sustainable 
economic growth with external stability. The 
idea was that such a follow-up program would 
be supported with a standby arrangement from 
the IMF, on the basis of a positive assessment 
that the government’s capacity for planning 
and policy implementation was adequate.24 
In their request for EPCA, Iraqi authorities 
indicated that they planned to seek further 
financial support from the IMF in the form of 
an upper-credit tranche standby arrangement 
in 2005, on the assumption that sufficient 
progress had been made in strengthening 
administrative and institutional capacity under 
the program.25 
For its part, the Iraqi government pledged 
to develop a comprehensive economic and 
financial program. The IMF stressed that it 
was important for the authorities to adhere to 
their commitment to prioritize any windfall oil 
revenues in favor of additional reconstruction 
investment and/or help meet budgetary needs 
in 2006 and beyond. The IMF also stressed the 
need to increase the price of petroleum 
products and to make monetary policy more 
adaptable by widening the number of 
instruments for managing liquidity conditions. 
They also emphasized the undertaking of 
structural reforms with regard to tax 
administration, payments and settlements 
systems, state-owned enterprise restructuring, 
and governance and transparency in the oil 
sector.26  
Iraq is under pressure to make significant 
progress at reform in several key areas not just 
from the IMF, but from the World Bank and 
the Paris Club as well.27 
First, these institutions are pressuring Iraq 
to reorient the economy toward an allocation 
system based on competition and free markets. 
In practice, this involves reducing the role of 
the state in the economy through restructuring 
the private sector, privatizing state-owned 
firms, and developing small and medium 
enterprises. There are some 192 state firms in 
Iraq with around 500,000 employees. By some 
estimates, up to 33 percent of this workforce 
may be “surplus”--that is, workers who could 
be removed with no discernable fall-off in 
output. If many of these individuals lose their 
jobs, it is doubtful that they could be absorbed 
by the formal private sector. Many will be 
forced into a life of crime or to find odd jobs 
in the country’s large informal economy. 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008) 31 
Impediments to Stability in Iraq: The Illusive Economic Dimension 
 
Second, Iraq must also gradually abolish 
government subsidies for basic consumer 
goods such as fuel--petroleum derivatives--
and food. Iraq’s extensive subsidy system 
provides most citizens with access to basic 
consumer goods, fuel, and electricity at 
extremely low prices. Reforms in this area are 
considered necessary if the country is to 
achieve fiscal solvency together with the 
creation of an efficient industrial structure. As 
discussed in more detail below, the distortion 
in market prices made possible by the 
country’s subsidy program has created an 
economic climate conducive to corruption. It 
has also generated income for the insurgency 
and encouraged crime (mainly smuggling)28 
and has weakened economic growth through 
diverting scarce public resources away from 
infrastructure and other directly productive 
investments. Last, it has stifled the 
development of the private sector. 
Third, Iraq needs to develop a social 
security network and support families hurt by 
price and structural reforms. In the likely 
absence of dynamic productivity gains, the 
phasing-out of subsidies will lead to rising 
prices throughout the economy. Both 
consumption and investment will be affected 
by rising costs. Most likely, increases in the 
costs of basic industrial inputs--such as fuel 
and electricity--will create added 
unemployment in the short term. In the 
absence of a comprehensive social security 
network, this added unemployment is likely to 
translate into an increase in the rate of poverty. 
In turn, a greater incidence of poverty may 
lead to even more unrest brought on by 
increased political and social tension, 
especially if those hurt see the reforms as 
imposed by outside powers such as the IMF, 
rather than a democratically elected 
government. 
This last point is important, because by the 
summer of 2005, the IMF was expressing 
concern that reform implementation was 
moving too slowly and that the country was 
not strictly adhering to the terms of the EPCA. 
Specifically, Iraqi officials were reluctant to 
increase domestic prices in key subsidized 
areas, particularly petroleum products. Under 
the EPCA timeline, the authorities were 
supposed to have begun the adjustment of 
domestic prices by the end of 2004. This did 
not occur. By mid-2005, gasoline prices in the 
black market had risen to very high levels, 
with the authorities continuing to supply 
gasoline locally at heavily subsidized prices--
less than two U.S. cents per liter (five cents 
per U.S. gallon), one of the lowest prices in 
the world, even though local refineries were 
unable to keep up with demand. Prices were 
several times higher in neighboring oil states 
such as Kuwait and Iran, while the price 
differential with Turkey may at times have 
been as much as ten times greater. 
As might be imagined from elementary 
economic theory, the low price of gasoline 
produced both shortages and thriving black 
markets. To ease the shortages, Iraq, a country 
with the world’s third largest crude oil 
reserves, spent $3.2 billion in 2004 on imports 
of petroleum products--mostly gasoline.29 
Ironically, much of the imported petroleum 
products had originated in Iraq, only to be 
smuggled out of the country to take advantage 
of the Iraq/external price differential. 
The cost of buying from neighboring 
countries is magnified by rampant export 
smuggling, with a steady stream of subsidized 
gasoline flowing back out of the same 
countries from which the government bought 
it. Black market fuel dealers, offering a faster 
alternative to queuing at the pumps, exploit 
the artificial price gap. The insurgency is also 
heavily involved in black market arbitrage.30 
The resulting revenue loss in the government 
budget was as much as $8 billion, or 30 
percent of GDP in 2004. 31 
While the economic solution to smuggling 
and black markets is rather straight-forward--
simply let the price of gasoline be determined 
by market forces--there is considerable 
opposition to this in Iraq. Iraqis mired in 
poverty have become too dependent on cheap 
fuel, with many arguing that Saddam Hussein 
always produced enough gasoline to meet 
local demand, even during the 13-year period 
of UN-imposed sanctions.  
For its part, the Iraqi government has tried 
to avoid price increases through various 
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initiatives designed to decrease local 
consumption. One plan ordered drivers to 
leave their cars at home on alternating days 
based on odd- or even-numbered license 
plates. However, as might be imagined, the 
rule was hard to enforce, with many drivers 
reportedly using two sets of plates and 
switching them daily to avoid the heavy non-
compliance fine.32 
Finally, toward the end of 2005, under 
pressure from the IMF and facing mounting 
opposition to non-price solutions, the Iraqi 
cabinet agreed to raise the price of petroleum 
and petroleum derivatives by between 100 and 
200 percent. This would bring the price per 
liter for regular gasoline to 50 dinars and for 
refined gasoline to 150 dinars, in addition to 
price increases for other derivatives of white 
petroleum and liquefied gas.33 This was meant 
to be the first in a series of increases designed 
to raise the price of fuel to the average in 
Persian Gulf States--about 93 cents per 
gallon.34 
Clearly, the fuel price increases were 
undertaken largely to qualify for the next 
phase of IMF lending. However, a very good 
economic case can be made that the price 
reforms were clearly in the government and 
country’s best interest. A World Bank analysis 
of the country’s domestic fuel markets 
concluded that black market prices averaged 
ten to 40 times above the official ones.35 The 
bank’s econometric simulations suggested that 
a six-fold increase in fuel prices would lead to 
a 16 percent decline in fuel imports and a 30 
percent decline in black market sales. 
Government savings would amount to about 
$1.73 billion, allowing for additional 
investment and/or compensation to 
households. 
However, the resistance met by the 
government’s December 18, 2005 decision to 
increase fuel prices raises a question about 
Baghdad’s ability to impose economic reforms 
in the face of popular and provincial 
opposition. That the government was not able 
to make a convincing case to the public on 
such an obviously beneficial policy raises 
serious doubts about the future of economic 
reform in Iraq. 
 
Oil and Iraqi Development 
 
The Iraqi constitution will play a 
significant role in structuring both production 
and revenue developments in the oil sector. 
For this reason, of all the articles in the 
constitution, those relating to oil have been the 
most contentious. The key provisions are 
outlined in Articles 109 and 110.36 
Article 109 states: “Oil and gas is the 
property of all the Iraqi people in all the 
regions and provinces.”  
Article 110 states:  
 
1st The federal government will 
administer oil and gas extracted from 
current fields in cooperation with the 
governments of the producing regions 
and provinces on condition that the 
revenues will be distributed fairly in a 
manner compatible with the 
demographical distribution all over the 
country. A quota should be defined for 
a specified time for affected regions 
that were deprived in an unfair way by 
the former regime or later on, in a way 
to ensure balanced development in 
different parts of the country. This 
should be regulated by law. 
 
2nd The federal government and the 
governments of the producing regions 
and provinces together will draw up 
the necessary strategic policies to 
develop oil and gas wealth to bring the 
greatest benefit for the Iraqi people, 
relying on the most modern 
techniques, market principles and 
encouraging investment. 
 
Article 110 clarifies that revenue-sharing 
will be based on needs as well as demography, 
reflecting the region’s “duties and obligations, 
and taking into consideration the [region’s] 
resources and needs.” 
The wording of Article 110 hints that 
exploration and development strategy will be 
undertaken in partnership with the regions. 
The wording of Article 109 does not exclude 
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foreign ownership of upstream oil industry 
assets, though most senior oil officials are not 
in favor of this level of foreign investment. 
Presumably, the detail of hydrocarbon 
development policy will be left to national and 
regional legislatures. 37 
The constitution’s treatment of oil 
production and revenues presents a number of 
unattractive scenarios to the Sunnis, and it is 
easy to see why they have been quite opposed 
to the new charter. Specifically, they are 
concerned with the creation of a federal 
system in which they are at a major financial 
disadvantage in comparison to the Kurds and 
Shi’as. In this regard, the constitution defines 
a “region” as one or more provinces that 
choose by referendum to form a region. (A 
referendum can be called fairly easily, either 
by one-third of the members in the relevant 
provincial councils or by one-tenth of the 
voters in these provinces.) Moreover, two or 
more regions have the right to create a single 
larger region. As Fred Kaplan summarizes it: 
“Here is the Sunni nightmare in plain black 
and white: The Kurds are allowed to form a 
single supra-region in the oil-rich north, the 
Shiites to form theirs in the oil-rich south, 
while the Sunnis are left in the oil-dry 
center.”38 Clearly, the Sunnis fear that the 
Kurds and Shi’as will create their own super-
regions, which will dominate Iraqi politics and 
economics. 
As noted above, Article 110 addresses the 
resulting inequities by declaring that revenue 
from oil and gas extraction will be fairly 
distributed throughout the country according 
to need. However, this refers only to revenue 
from “current” oil and gas fields, not from the 
vast untapped wells. Sunnis fear they will see 
little revenue derived from new wells brought 
on-line in the future. As the constitution 
stands, the regions are delegated authority 
over all new fields and therefore have control 
over the negotiation of exploration contracts 
and the bulk of revenues derived from future 
production. 
Article 110 suggests that the Sunni areas 
could be disadvantaged for some time on the 
grounds that the Shi’a south and Kurdish north 
suffered chronic underdevelopment during the 
Saddam era. The exact formula for revenue-
sharing will be fluid and shaped by Iraq’s 
national parliament, where the Sunnis are 
likely to be a distinct minority. 
Over the past few years, the Kurdish 
government concluded at least three 
production-sharing agreements with Turkish 
and Norwegian companies that cover several 
fields in the Kurdish areas. Those deals were 
done independent of the Iraqi oil ministry. At 
the same time, Baghdad did not recognize 
those agreements and warned companies 
against signing such agreements. With the new 
constitution, such agreements would now 
become legal. 39 
While turning a de facto situation in 
Kurdistan into a legitimate one, the 
implications for the rest of Iraq are even more 
significant. Iraqi oil experts warn that while 
the role of the federal government in oil 
matters has been marginalized, the powers of 
the Shi’a oil-producing region in the south are 
more likely to grow. There are two producing 
governorates in the south--Basra and Maysan. 
However, other governorates such as 
Nasiriyya, which contains the Gharraf oil 
field, have non-exploited oil fields. According 
to the constitution, those governorates can set 
up regions and become semiautonomous, like 
the region of Kurdistan. 40 
Related concerns have been expressed by a 
number of knowledgeable oil executives and 
industry analysts. The main concern is that the 
constitution as worded could lead to several 
autonomous zones under which a central 
government in Baghdad would not have 
complete control over oil resources.41 
Optimists say that in the longer term, a 
decentralized government could lead to a 
faster development of Iraq’s oil and gas fields. 
However, Sunni dissatisfaction with the 
constitution could agitate the insurgency 
further and keep foreign investments at bay. In 
that case, only the Kurdish region, which has 
been spared the security problems 
characteristic of the rest of Iraq, would be able 
to attract foreign companies to invest in 
developing its oil and gas fields. 42 
With oil revenue assignment shifting more 
toward the producing regions, the ability and 
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perhaps willingness of local governments to 
pursue independent policies will increase with 
time. The likelihood of adverse rentier effects 
may increase with oil revenues concentrated in 
the hands of the regional governments. In this 
environment it is easy to visualize a vicious 
circle setting (Figure 1) whereby the 
distributive formulas embedded in the 
constitution skew policy-making decisions 
towards an over-reliance on oil revenues, 
leading to poor economic outcomes, which in 
turn skew policy preferences more toward 
short-run distributive--rather than efficiency--
outcomes. 
If rentier-state effects are subsequently 
strengthened, corruption and a more active 
insurgency are likely to reinforce the process 
of economic decline. On the other hand, if 
rentier-state effects can be controlled or 
weakened, then economic outcomes improve 
and with that, the possibility of establishing a 
virtuous circle strengthening the federation. 
With increased political stability, there will be 
further gains in economic activity. This 
longer-term virtuous circle can be further 
strengthened if stability results in a 
reorientation of economic policies from short- 
to longer-term focus with stabilization funds 
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There are some 
encouraging signs. In the 
southern provinces, interviews of voters 
suggest that the critical issue is to ensure that 
the proceeds of Iraq’s oil exports are 
distributed more fairly than in the past--
something that is explicitly catered to in the 
constitution. The impulse toward creating a 
virtual separate state is not as strong in the 
south as it is in the Kurdish north. Southern 
voters, for the most part, seemed to view the 
constitution as a vital step towards peace and 
stability, rather than as a divisive, provocative 






Although the Sunnis opposed the 
decentralization structure of the new 
constitution, their opposition centers more on 
the potential loss of oil revenues to the Kurds 
and Shi’a and less on regaining control of the 
entire country.44 
What might the government consider in the 
way of modifying the economic sections of the 
existing constitution? One option that has 
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received surprisingly little attention is the 
simple one of distributing a relatively large 
share of oil revenues directly to the 
population. A clear advantage of this approach 
is that it would give the Sunnis a clear stake in 
the success of the economy. Acts of 
insurgency that jeopardize oil revenues would 
directly hurt large segments of the Sunni 
community. Formalization of this type of 
distributive system would allay Sunni fears 
that at some time in the future they would be 
completely cut off from the country’s oil 
revenues. 
 A number of other benefits would also 
flow from the direct disbursement policy. 
With direct payments, massive subsidies and 
price controls would no longer be needed and 
could be phased out quickly, leaving prices to 
be determined by market forces. The broad-
based demand that would be created from 
increased purchasing power no doubt would 
provide opportunities for more profitable 
small-scale private sector businesses. Many 
studies of small- and medium-sized businesses 
in developing countries have concluded that 
businesses of this type are the chief engines of 
job creation and innovative activity. 
As the experience of the transitioning 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe has 
shown, in addition to job creation and 
innovation, growing business sectors often 
find it in their best interest to press 
governments for additional market reforms. 
Governments, in turn, find it is in their interest 
to nurture this new base of prosperity and 
respond accordingly. In this way, it is 
conceivable that a virtuous circle of growth, 
reform, and further growth could be put in 
place over time in Iraq. The country has the 
broad-based talent, skills, and ingenuity to 
prosper if only it can break the link between 
state and oil, with its corrupting and 
debilitating influence. 
Unfortunately, to date, improvements in 
economic performance have been limited. An 
independent assessment, made in late 2007 by 
Stuart W. Bowen the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), 
notes some bright spots,45 including economic 
growth in the Kurdish north;46 tribal 
reconciliation in the western desert province 
of Anbar; and patchy progress in the 
development of local governments. Beyond 
that, some of the provinces are showing 
increasing ability to create plans, write 
contracts, and carry out construction projects 
to rebuild Iraq’s physical infrastructure.47 
Skill shortages are, however, impeding 
progress in many local governments and 
mi
key areas across the country. For 
naging 
st provinces, 
ams are beginning 
ent of local reconstruction 




Clearly, many factors are still impeding 
progress in 
example:49 
• The failure of the Council of 
Representatives to pass a provincial 
powers law that defines local 
governments’ rights and 
responsibilities has limited provincial 
councils’ effectiveness in ma
their governmental institutions. 
• Weak and uncoordinated rule of law 
programs within the provinces and at 
the national level have been a 
continuing problem. In mo
there is little cooperation. 
• Among the police, courts, and 
correctional facilities, judicial orders 
are routinely ignored. 
• Efforts to increase local living 
standards and reduce unemployment 
have been undermined by the 
dangerous security situation, but 
micro-lending programs, agribusiness 
development, and small-business 
development progr
to make headway. 
• Provincial governments have limited 
capacity to manage and sustain 
infrastructure and to budget for 
operations and maintenance, but some 
improvements have been noted in Iraqi 
managem
projects. 
• Local political reconciliation efforts 
have been undermined in some areas 
by rival Shi’a groups, a sense of 
alienation among Sunnis, and growing 
frustration over the in
g
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At the risk of over-generalizing, the greater 
picture is one of high investment and rapid 
increase of incomes in the Kurdish regions, 
promise of stability and improved prospects in 
the Sunni region of al-Anbar, and continued 
stagnation in Baghdad with limited pockets of 
progress in the Southern provinces. One 
danger of the development of distinct regional 
economies is the Balkanization of Iraq, which 
may in the longer term impede efforts to 
consolidate the country around a strong central 
government. There are already an increasing 
number of examples of provinces defying the 
central government through such actions as 
withdrawing their electricity generation from 
the national grid.50 
 What accounts for this sad state of affairs? 
The failure to integrate economic programs 
more tightly with political and military 
dimensions is a major factor. Since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the economy 
has largely been an afterthought with the result 
that political and military gains are hard to 
sustain in an environment of grinding poverty 
and unemployment. 
One of the main lessons learned from the 
British experience in Southern Iraq was that:51 
 
In conditions of economic stagnation 
the security forces find that they are 
dealing with general public order 
issues caused by significant numbers 
of ordinary disgruntled Iraqis, rather 
than the pure terrorist threat. What is 
required is a balanced approach with 
equal focus on the redevelopment of 
the domestic economy as well as the 





Iraq’s economic future will be largely 
determined by events surrounding the oil 
sector together with the adoption of a number 
of the basic principles noted in the previous 
section. One can easily envision a bright 
future as well as one quite grim. There are, 
however, several simple guidelines that Iraq’s 
leaders should keep in mind. Most 
importantly, the true test of the expenditure of 
scarce resources in Iraq should be the total 
contribution to political and economic 
development. Expenditure patterns that 
contribute to the avoidance of rentier-state 
effects are likely to be the most productive for 
the country’s eventual recovery and growth. 
Fortunately, within Iraq there appears to be 
increasing acceptance of these principles. On 
July 27, 2006, the Iraqi government and the 
United Nations announced the creation of the 
International Compact with Iraq. Over a five-
year period the Compact--jointly chaired by 
the government of Iraq and the United Nations 
with the support of the World Bank--is to aim 
to unite the international community and 
multilateral organizations to help in Iraq’s 
recovery. 
The Compact primarily focuses on building 
a framework for Iraq’s economic 
transformation and on Iraq’s integration into 
the regional and global economy. To achieve 
this goal the government of Iraq will focus on 
political inclusion and consensus-building, 
establishing professional security forces, 
tackling corruption, creating a transparent and 
efficient oil sector, developing a solid 
budgetary framework, and improving 
governance by building and consolidating 
effective national institutions. 
Hopefully this is a blueprint for Iraq to 
achieve its national vision “[t]hat in five years 
Iraq shall be a united, federal and democratic 
country, at peace with its neighbors and itself, 
well on its way to sustainable economic self-
sufficiency and prosperity.”52 
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